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A Unified Constitutional View of Financial Punishment: 
Synthesizing the Excessive Fines Clause and Bearden-
Based Protections 
Joshua M. Feinzig1 
This Note coordinates the Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines Clause 
with the Fourteenth Amendment wealth-discrimination protection set forth 
in Bearden v. Georgia. It is generally assumed that the two protections 
operate independently: while the Excessive Fines Clause protects individuals 
against exorbitant financial obligations, Bearden limits the state from 
converting criminal debt into a severe liberty deprivation. But in recognizing 
how the two doctrines are normatively and functionally reinforcing, this 
Note proposes a single framework for considering financial punishment’s 
constitutionality.  
If the Eighth Amendment protection applies at the imposition of a 
financial punishment, Bearden provides a “second look” at the 
constitutionality of that punishment. Or, put another way, the Eighth 
Amendment is a preemptive look at the downstream poverty-based liberty 
deprivations that Bearden secures individuals against. Appreciating this 
relationship affords additional authority to both protections, and suggests a 
number of improvements to existing safeguards. 
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Unfair and persistent fines and fees practices, and the “criminal debt” 
that results, have given rise to a two-tiered system of criminal justice. 
Financial punishment encumbers poor individuals in court appearances, 
police contacts and arrests, and periods of imprisonment—feeding a cycle 
of mass incarceration and poverty, and subverting the promise of equal 
citizenship.2 Though this phenomenon has received increased attention 
from legislatures and courts in the wake of Ferguson, the costs of financial 
obligations continue to expand.3 
The mixed equal protection-due process framework associated with 
Bearden v. Georgia has provided the main constitutional intervention into 
this cycle.4 In Bearden itself, the Supreme Court considered the 
 
2. See Alexes Harris et al., Drawing Blood from Stones: Legal Debt and Social 
Inequality in the Contemporary United States, 155 AM. J. OF SOC. 1753, 1777 
(2010). 
3. See Lisa Foster, Judicial Responsibility for Justice in Criminal Courts, 46 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 21, 27 (2017) (noting that nearly every state has increased 
the rates of their civil and criminal fines and fees since 2010). I use “financial 
obligation” to include fines, forfeitures, fees, court costs, and restitution. For 
a description of each, see Karin D. Martin et al., Shackled to Debt: Criminal 
Justice Financial Obligations and the Barriers to Re-Entry They Create, NEW 
THINKING IN COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS 2 (2017), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/249976.pdf [https://perma.cc/95SU-
RHL8]. 
4. 461 U.S. 660 (1983). See infra Section II.B describing the Bearden case line 
and the hybridized due process-equal protection constitutional architecture 
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relationship between indigency and the constitutionality of imprisonment. 
The Court embraced a hybridized due process and equal protection 
rationale, since described by commentators as “equal process”5 or “the 
‘alchemy’ of equal protection and due process,”6 to determine that Danny 
Bearden’s probation could not be revoked solely because he was unable to 
afford a financial obligation. 
But in 2019, the Court incorporated the Eighth Amendment’s 
Excessive Fines Clause against the states in Timbs v. Indiana.7 It is likely 
path dependency, rather than some essential limitation at the heart of the 
Clause, that explains why Bearden has served as the dominant 
constitutional frame through which courts, litigants, and scholars have 
addressed the constitutionality of financial punishment.8 That said, Timbs 
provides an opportunity to assess both doctrines in light of one another. 
This work attempts to coordinate the Clause with Bearden-based 
protections, bringing their rationales into alignment and asking how the 
relationship might be characterized within constitutional theory and 
procedure. 
The Excessive Fines Clause is assumed to apply at sentencing or when 
an obligation is otherwise “imposed.”9 Only after imposition does the 
 
developed around it. See also Colin Reingold, Pretextual Sanctions, Contempt, 
and the Practical Limits of Bearden-Based Debtors’ Prison Litigation, 21 MICH. 
J. RACE & L. 361, 362 (2016) (“Today, Bearden is invoked in courtrooms 
throughout America to protest when judges attempt to jail a defendant for 
reasons that directly or indirectly stem from poverty.”). 
5. Brandon L. Garrett, Wealth, Equal Protection, and Due Process, 61 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 397, 402 (2019). 
6. Judith Resnik, (Un)Constitutional Punishment: Eighth Amendment Silos, 
Penological Purposes, and People’s “Ruin,” 129 YALE L.J.F. 365, 389 (2020) 
[hereinafter Resnik, (Un)Constitutional Punishment]. 
7. 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019). 
8. See Resnik, (Un)Constitutional Punishment, supra note 6, at 386 (“Indeed, had 
Timbs been decided in the 1960s, Williams [a case closely related to Bearden, 
see infra Section II.B.1] might also have explored the import of the Excessive 
Fines Clause.”). Given the longstanding dormancy of the Clause, courts have 
not analyzed the two in tandem. A Westlaw search of Bearden and 
Timbs/Bajakajian (the prominent Excessive Fines Clause case before Timbs) 
yields only five instances in which both claims are raised and discussed in 
the same federal court decision. 
9. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive 
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”). 
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Bearden-based protection curb the conversion of an unaffordable financial 
obligation into a constitutionally registered liberty deprivation—including, 
but not limited to, incarceration.10 As of now, few substantive 
constitutional protections are in place at imposition and before the 
moment of conversion. But when kept in view of their shared purpose and 
overlapping applications, the two protections reinforce one another and 
suggest additional safeguards throughout the interim period.11 
Understanding the interplay between the two protections would thus be of 
immense value to litigants and courts seeking to develop an excessive fines 
jurisprudence that can address the myriad forms of financial punishment 
and adapt as new forms emerge. 
This Essay’s analysis unfolds in four Parts. Part I considers the current 
state of the Excessive Fines Clause. Section I.A surveys the Court’s limited 
excessive fines case law. Though the Court has yet to formally recognize 
the constitutional necessity of an individualized inquiry into affordability 
(an “ability-to-pay” inquiry) at the moment a fine is imposed, neither has it 
foreclosed the possibility. Section I.B describes the interpretative 
approaches to the Clause that have been elsewhere proposed, and suggests 
that Bearden provides an unexplored though promising vantage from 
which to justify an upfront ability-to-pay inquiry and bolster the Clause’s 
authority. 
Part II examines the Bearden and excessive fines doctrines on their 
own terms, before considering their many conceptual and practical points 
of convergence. Section II.A traces the history of the Clause through the 
lens of the Timbs opinions, and argues that the Clause’s recent 
 
10. See infra Section II.B.2. 
11. Given the “post hoc” character of the Bearden protection, Beth Colgan has 
argued that the Eighth Amendment would provide a more robust and 
upfront means for curbing wealth discrimination in the criminal justice 
system, for the Bearden protection only kicks in after the individual is 
imperiled in court-imposed debt. See Beth A. Colgan, The Excessive Fines 
Clause: Challenging the Modern Debtors’ Prison, 65 UCLA L. REV. 2 (2018). 
Colgan observes that the Excessive Fines Clause is preferable to the Bearden 
protection and should be the focus for reform. In my view, the two 
protections are normatively reinforcing corollaries, both of which should 
have import across the debt-imposition continuum. Even if the Excessive 
Fines Clause is a more promising focal point notwithstanding its dormancy, 
Bearden and its related line of cases can amplify the substantive protections 
afforded by the Clause and help orient its development. See infra Section 
III.B. 
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incorporation infused it with anti-subordination principles that further 
suggest the necessity of an individualized inquiry. Section II.B examines 
the Bearden line of cases and works to make sense of the hybridized equal 
protection-due process framework. 
Part III then shows the two doctrines to be normatively reinforcing. 
For instance, both are fundamentally concerned with predatory uses of the 
state’s punishment authority to extract payment. In light of that shared 
purpose, a number of updates to the protections are required—including 
an ability-to-pay inquiry at the moment a fine is imposed—to adjust the 
law to new institutional forms of financial punishment and collection. 
From the standpoint of the Excessive Fines Clause at-imposition 
protection, Bearden might be conceptualized as a “second-look” protection 
along the logic of Miller12 and Montgomery.13 From the standpoint of the 
Bearden at-conversion protection, the Excessive Fines Clause might be 
conceptualized as a preemptive look at downstream liberty deprivations. 
On either view, the pains of financial punishment are so drastic, and 
predatory revenue generation and wealth-based liberty deprivations so 
widespread, that multiple points of constitutional protection across the 
criminal-debt continuum are required. 
I. THE EXCESSIVE FINES CLAUSE AND ABILITY-TO-PAY PROTECTIONS 
A. The Doctrine After Timbs 
In Timbs v. Indiana,14 the Court traced the Excessive Fines Clause back 
to the Magna Carta’s requirement that monetary sanctions “not be so large 
as to deprive [an offender] of his livelihood.”15 While protecting an 
individual’s “livelihood” would seem to require courts to consider whether 
the individual can afford the sanction, the Court clarified that it “tak[es] no 
position on the question whether a person’s income and wealth are 
relevant considerations in judging the excessiveness of a fine.”16 The 
 
12. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). 
13. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016). 
14. 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019). 
15. Id. at 688 (alteration in original) (quoting Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. 
v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 271 (1989)). 
16. Id. at 688 (noting that it previously took no position on the question in 
United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 340 n.15 (1998)). 
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constitutional relevance of a defendant’s ability to pay therefore remains 
formally undecided by the Court, though the majority and concurring 
opinions’ argumentative logic highly suggests that the inquiry is 
required.17 
Because the Supreme Court had only interpreted the Clause on five 
occasions before Timbs and without much practical effect, the potential for 
the Clause to provide an additional source of constitutional protection still 
remains uncertain.18 In Bajakajian, the Court’s most recent Excessive Fines 
Clause decision before Timbs, the Court held that a gross 
disproportionality standard—which it adopted wholesale from the Cruel 
and Unusual Punishment domain—is the touchstone of excessiveness.19 
Lower courts have varied in their applications of this standard and its 
attending factors.20 When Tyson Timbs’s challenge to the forfeiture of his 
 
17. See infra Section II.A. The paradigmatic harms of excessive fines, as depicted 
in Timbs, turn on particular assumptions about economic circumstance. For 
instance, Black Code vagrancy fines compelled former slaves back into 
servitude, recreating slavery in fact, precisely because former slaves were 
unable to pay these fines. 
18. See Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 328–33; Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 618 
(1993); Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 558–59 (1993); Browning-
Ferris Indus., 492 U.S. at 275–76. While the Court has clarified that both 
criminal and civil forfeitures are subject to the Clause, as are monetary and 
in-kind forfeitures, it has also held that an obligation must be punitive in 
nature. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 610. But see Colgan, The Excessive Fines Clause: 
Challenging the Modern Debtors’ Prison, supra note 11, at 32-41 (2018) 
(arguing that fines, fees, and restitution all constitute economic sanctions 
and thus should qualify under the Clause). Bearden protections more 
straightforwardly apply to punitive and remedial obligations alike, including 
reparations and restitution. See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 667 (1983) 
(reasoning that incarceration stemming from an unpaid fine is as 
constitutionally problematic as that stemming from unpaid restitution). 
19. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 322. The Court described a number of factors that 
bear on an offense’s gravity and that should be weighed within the gross 
disproportionality test, including whether the violated statute was 
principally designed to bar the defendant’s offense, id. at 338; the maximum 
sentence for the offense per the Sentencing Guidelines, id.; the harm caused 
by the offense, id.; and whether monetary sanctions would have been 
levelled against the offender during the Founding Era, id. at 340. 
20. Compare United States v. Seher, 562 F.3d 1344, 1370 (11th Cir. 2009) 
(determining that the Court has prescribed a complete three-factor test), 
with United States v. Beecroft, 825 F.3d 991, 1000 (9th Cir. 2016) 
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vehicle was remanded to the Indiana Supreme Court later in 2019, the 
court observed that Bajakajian “took no position on whether a person’s 
income and wealth are relevant considerations in judging the 
excessiveness of a fine” but still construed Timbs to mandate that “the 
forfeiture’s effect on the owner is an appropriate consideration in 
determining the harshness of the forfeiture’s punishment.”21 Most circuits 
remain tepid in their approach to such an individualized determination of 
economic circumstances, having either rejected the prospect outright22 or 
not yet passed judgment on the inquiry’s constitutional status.23 
Meanwhile, the First and Second Circuits have both held that a defendant’s 
 
(determining that the Court has prescribed a complete four-factor test), and 
United States v. Viloski, 814 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir. 2016) (determining that 
the Court has prescribed a four-factor test that permits the evaluation of 
additional factors). See generally United States v. Wagoner Cnty. Real Estate, 
278 F.3d 1091, 1101 (10th Cir. 2002) (“To adapt the Bajakajian standard to 
[new] circumstances, we must supplement the factors discussed by the 
Supreme Court.”). Because the Court noted in Timbs that it has yet to 
determine whether an individual’s ability to pay should bear on assessments 
of gross disproportionality, the Court itself does not seem to view the 
Bajakajian decision as having provided a complete account of all relevant 
factors. 
21. State v. Timbs, 134 N.E.3d 12, 36 (Ind. 2019). 
22. The Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have expressly held that an individual’s 
ability to pay does not bear on the gross disproportionality test. See, e.g., 
United States v. Beecroft, 825 F.3d 991, 997 n.5 (9th Cir. 2016); United States 
v. Carlyle, 712 Fed. Appx. 862, 864 (11th Cir. 2017). 
23. The D.C., Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have not 
expressly decided whether ability to pay is a relevant constitutional inquiry. 
The D.C. Circuit recently observed that “[t]he Excessive Fines Clause does not 
make obvious whether a forfeiture is excessive because a defendant is 
unable to pay.” United States v. Bikundi, 926 F.3d 761, 796 (D.C. Cir. 2019). 
However, it also noted that the ability-to-pay inquiry “draws support from 
the First Circuit [gross disproportionality test] . . . and from scholarship” on 
the original meaning of the Excessive Fines Clause. Id. at 796 n.5. See also, 
e.g., United States v. Young, 618 Fed. Appx. 96 (3d Cir. 2015); United States v. 
Blackman, 746 F.3d 137 (4th Cir. 2014); United States v. Wallace, 389 F.3d 
483 (5th Cir. 2004); United States v. Ely, 468 F.3d 399 (6th Cir. 2006); United 
States v. Malewicka, 664 F.3d 1099 (7th Cir. 2011); Wagoner Cnty. Real 
Estate, 278 F.3d at 1101. 
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financial circumstances should inform determinations of 
constitutionality.24 
B. Interpretative Paths to Heightened Excessive Fines Protections 
In recent years, and especially in the wake of Timbs, a variety of 
constitutional arguments favoring more robust protections have been 
developed. Most use historical-originalist reasoning to assign the Clause 
additional authority. Though the historical origins of the Clause long failed 
to attract much attention, these newer works canvass the Clause’s 
intellectual history and provide insight into the nature of financial 
obligations during late medieval, colonial, and early American periods.25 
 
24. While the First Circuit has framed inability to pay as a threshold 
consideration outside, and thus separate from, the gross disproportionality 
calculus, e.g., United States v. Levesque, 546 F.3d 78, 85 (1st Cir. 2008), the 
Second and Eighth Circuits have characterized inability to pay as another 
Bajakajian factor to be weighed within the calculus, e.g., United States v. 
Viloski, 814 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir. 2016); United States v. Smith, 656 F.3d 
821, 828 (8th Cir. 2011). In other words, the First Circuit’s test takes 
indigency as an absolute or per se constraint on financial punishment, while 
the Second Circuit test would continue to allow severe fines to the extent the 
livelihood deprivation concern is eclipsed by other Bajakajian factors—
including the gravity of the offense and the harm caused by the particular 
criminalized act. It need not be the case that the threshold formulation 
provides greater protection in practice than the Second Circuit’s nested 
formulation. For instance, if ability to pay is framed as a factor rather than an 
“all or nothing” consideration, courts might weigh financial hardship within 
the proportionality analysis even in cases where such hardship does not rise 
to a level of abject livelihood deprivation. A threshold formulation of the 
inquiry would seem to foreclose this graduated approach. 
25. Nicholas McLean’s Livelihood, Ability to Pay, and the Original Meaning of the 
Excessive Fines Clause, 40 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 833 (2013), provides perhaps 
the most comprehensive account of the Clause’s original meaning. Beth 
Colgan’s Reviving the Excessive Fines Clause, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 277 (2014), 
also demonstrates that a principle against permanent impoverishment is 
exhibited in the Magna Carta and throughout early American law, and—like 
McLean—concludes that an historically accurate understanding of 
“excessive” would account for the individual-specific effects of fines. Other 
relevant historical accounts include WILLIAM S. MCKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA: A 
COMMENTARY ON THE GREAT CHARTER OF KING JOHN 285-86 (2d ed. 1914); Kevin 
Bennardo, Restitution and the Excessive Fines Clause, 77 LA. L. REV. 21 (2016); 
C. Massey, The Excessive Fines Clause and Punitive Damages: Some Lessons 
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The evidence generally supports the view that individual economic 
circumstances were considered in some instances of state-imposed 
financial penalties, though the character of these assessments remains 
somewhat murky. Of course, analogizing between these early practices 
and modern financial punishment involves a predictable array of 
interpretative difficulties. 
In a more purposivist mode, others argue that measuring 
excessiveness with respect to a person’s financial situation would further 
the core principles of criminal law. An individualized inquiry comports 
with the values animating the Court’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments 
proportionality doctrine—including sentencing equality, 
commensurability between offense and punishment, and the preservation 
of human dignity.26 In a similar vein, the “anti-ruination” constraint 
running through Eighth Amendment cases constitutionally bars the state 
from destroying people financially, just as it bars bodily destruction.27 It 
too would necessitate such an inquiry. 
An intersectional reading of Bearden and the Clause can bolster these 
conclusions while providing its own unique advantages. For one, moving 
the analysis beyond the Eighth Amendment helps to overcome various 
impasses posed by punishment-proportionality doctrine. The gross 
disproportionality standard is broadly permissive,28 and may be in minor 
 
from History, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1233 (1987); and James S. McDonald, Note, 
Excessive Fine and the Indigent—An Historical Argument, 42 MISS. L.J. 265 
(1971). 
26. Colgan has compellingly developed these arguments across a number of 
works. E.g., Colgan, supra note 11; Beth A. Colgan, Graduating Economic 
Sanctions According to Ability to Pay, 103 IOWA L. REV. 53 (2017); BETH A. 
COLGAN, ADDRESSING MODERN DAY DEBTORS’ PRISONS WITH GRADUATED ECONOMIC 
SANCTIONS THAT DEPEND ON ABILITY TO PAY, HAMILTON PROJECT (March 2019), 
https://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/Colgan_PP_201903014.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SL4C-9DNA]. 
27. See Resnik, supra note 6, at 369. 
28. Cf. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring 
in part and concurring in the judgment) (describing how the highly 
deferential Cruel and Unusual Punishment standard only forbids “extreme 
sentences that are ‘grossly disproportionate’ to the crime”) (emphasis 
added); Transcript of Oral Argument at 24, Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682 
(2019) (Kagan, J.) (“We’ve made it awfully, awfully hard to assert a 
disproportionality claim with respect even to imprisonment.”). Brandon 
Buskey of the ACLU has argued that the gross disproportionality standard is 
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tension with an individualized, effects-specific approach to measuring a 
fine’s severity.29 More fundamentally, from inside the Eighth Amendment, 
it can be difficult to reconcile the constitutional bar on livelihood-
depriving fines with the (as of now) permissibility of execution, solitary 
confinement, and extensive prison terms.30 This is not to say these 
tensions are irreconcilable, or that the Eighth Amendment cannot provide 
answers on its own.31 But widening the interpretative lens can promote 
new ways of thinking about the Clause and the constitutionality of 
financial punishment more generally. We should ask why, for instance, the 
Bearden view of the problem necessitates individualized consideration and 
heightened-scrutiny review, while the Eighth Amendment view is, at least 
putatively, highly deferential to the state.32 
 
so misaligned with the crisis of financial punishment that the Court should 
overturn Bajakajian entirely, replacing it with the more stringent Excessive 
Bail test. See Brandon Buskey, A Proposal to Stop Tinkering with the 
Machinery of Debt, 129 YALE L.J.F. 415 (2020). 
29. The gross disproportionality standard applied in the noncapital Cruel and 
Unusual Punishments Clause context measures the fit between the act 
committed and the associated punishment without regard for the 
individual’s experience of the severity of that punishment. E.g., Harmelin, 
501 U.S. at 1000-01. But the Court undertakes effects-based, individualized 
determinations in other Eighth Amendment domains—namely, capital 
punishment and life without parole. See William W. Berry, Individualized 
Sentencing, 76 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 13, 53 (2019). The tension here may thus 
not be significant if viewed from these other domains. 
30. Cf. United States v. Viloski, 814 F.3d at 112 n.13 (“If the Eighth Amendment 
permits the Government to end some offenders’ lives . . . it surely permits the 
Government to destroy other offenders’ livelihoods.”). 
31. See, e.g., Resnik, supra note 6, at 393 (“Eighteenth century commentaries 
proffered a utilitarian rationale for the incongruity that permitted 
governments to end a person’s life yet not ‘ruin’ a person economically. One 
explanation was about perverse incentives, if a minor offense left a person in 
a ‘worse Condition’ than committing a capital crime.”). The revenue-
generation incentives built into financial punishment provides another angle 
from which to resolve the incongruity. While imprisonment and execution 
prove financially costly, fines are in the state’s fiscal interest and thus 
require additional constitutional restraint. Cf. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 978 n.9 
(opinion of Scalia, J.) (“[I]t makes sense to scrutinize governmental action 
more closely when the State stands to benefit.”). 
32. See infra Section III.B.1 for further discussion. 
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II. POINTS OF CONVERGENCE BETWEEN TIMBS AND BEARDEN 
This Part evaluates each protection in turn and begins to bridge them 
at the related levels of values and doctrines. Courts have read similar 
constitutional rationales into each protection, recognizing the significant 
liberty harms of economic deprivation33 and questioning the penological 
goals served by rendering someone financially destitute.34 At the doctrinal 
level, the two protections are related in their logical structures and overlap 
in their applications. 
Section II.A considers the Clause’s meaning in light of its incorporation 
and suggests that the livelihood deprivation principle at the center of the 
Timbs analysis has nested within it a range of individual liberty interests. 
This includes physical liberty (freedom from imprisonment), as well as 
other liberty interests implicated within the Bearden line. Section II.B then 
provides an account of the Bearden line’s development, its jurisprudential 
basis, and the viability of extending Bearden into domains beyond wealth-
based incarceration. 
A. The Paradigmatic Harms of Excessive Fines 
The Timbs decision was not mere “constitutional housekeeping.”35 
Instead, the process of incorporation—properly understood—recasts the 
Clause in light of Reconstruction Era anti-subordination principles and 
should inform our understanding of the liberty interests at stake in 
 
33. E.g., Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 689 (2019) (“Exorbitant tolls 
undermine other constitutional liberties.”). The state’s practice of “punishing 
a person for his poverty,” Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 671 (1983), is 
itself a negative consequence of economic deprivation. 
34. E.g., Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 689 (“[F]ines may be employed in a measure out of 
accord with the penal goals of retribution and deterrence, for fines are a 
source of revenue, while other forms of punishment cost a State money.” 
(citations and internal quotations omitted)); Bearden, 461 U.S. at 670-71 
(“Revoking the probation of someone who through no fault of his own is 
unable to make restitution will not make restitution suddenly forthcoming. 
Indeed, such a policy may have the perverse effect of inducing the 
probationer to use illegal means to acquire funds . . . .”). 
35. See Brianne J. Gorod & Brian R. Frazelle, Timbs v. Indiana: Mere 
Constitutional Housekeeping or the Timely Revival of a Critical Safeguard?, 
2019 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 215. 
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financial punishment. If the prototypical instance of extreme fining during 
the late medieval and early colonial periods concerned fines levied against 
political adversaries of the English Crown, the imagined rights bearer 
shifts to the newly freed slave come Reconstruction, and then come 
incorporation to Tyson Timbs—who, like many others today, lost his car 
through forfeiture and struggled to survive economically36 as a result.37 
Appreciating the core constitutional harms across these three phases 
makes the necessity of an ability-to-pay inquiry obvious. 
Timbs gives pride of place to the longstanding principle, originating 
with the Magna Carta, that financial punishment cannot ruin a person’s 
livelihood.38 The opinions draw a through-line from the early Magna Carta 
era to the seventeenth century, when Stuart kings and the High Court of 
Star Chamber violated this protection to raise revenue for the Crown in the 
absence of parliamentary grants.39 Beyond the perversities of using 
financial punishment to fill the Treasury, the Court emphasizes the 
Crown’s use of fines to debilitate political adversaries.40 Exorbitant fines 
forced prominent Crown opponents, including outspoken clerics and 
sheriffs, into silence or debtors’ prisons. With respect to these early, high-
profile instances, financial punishments not only violated the livelihood-
protecting principles sustained since the Magna Carta; they also served 
illegitimate forms of political compulsion and domination (namely, 
“retaliat[ing] against or chill[ing] the speech of political enemies”41). Of 
course, the nexus between economic punishment and political freedom—
and the nature of political freedoms themselves—has changed over the 
last three centuries, and grafting these earlier concerns regarding state 
 
36. I adopt the phrase and concept of “economic survival” from McLean, supra 
note 25, at 893 n.219. 
37. See Adam Liptak, He Sold Drugs for $225. Indiana Took His $42,000 Land 
Rover, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2018), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/25/us/politics/supreme-court-civil-
asset-forfeiture.html [https://perma.cc/34US-WFKK]. 
38. Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 688 (“Magna Carta required that economic sanctions ‘be 
proportioned to the wrong’ and ‘not be so large as to deprive [an offender] of 
his livelihood.’”). 
39. See Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 688; id. at 693 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
40. See id. at 689; id. at 694 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting how 
in 1682 the Sheriff of London was fined over $10 million for “speaking 
against the Duke of York”). 
41. See id. at 689. 
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domination onto the present is a complicated interpretative task. Still, the 
Timbs opinions recognize that financial punishment can prove destructive 
of one’s economic livelihood and political standing alike, and that both 
forms of destruction should offend our modern constitutional 
commitments. 
The opinions then shift to the decades following the Civil War, when 
southern states used abusive fines to “subjugate newly freed slaves and 
maintain the prewar racial hierarchy.”42 The Court recognizes that this use 
of fines was of urgent concern to the Reconstruction Congress.43 To the 
extent that the process of incorporation should update the meaning and 
purpose of a constitutional provision in accordance with Reconstruction 
Era principles,44 the Court’s own understanding of the relationship 
between fines and the institutional preservation of slavery is of heightened 
interpretative importance. 
By criminalizing “vagrancy” after the abolition of slavery, states levied 
fines against newly freed African Americans that, if unpaid, would convert 
into “forced labor” requirements.45 Through the use of Black Codes, fines 
 
42. Id. at 688; see also id. at 697-98 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas’s 
concurrence also includes an extended discussion of the Clause’s role in the 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries before Reconstruction. See id. at 
695-97. 
43. See id. at 698. 
44. See McLean, supra note 25, at 879-84 (providing an account, albeit pre-
Timbs, of the various ways in which incorporation should inform 
interpretations of the Clause); see also AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: 
CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 133 (1998); Jamal Greene, Fourteenth 
Amendment Originalism, 71 MD. L. REV. 978, 1011 (2000) (describing how, in 
Amar’s view, the “meaning and scope of an incorporated right [should] be 
understood with reference to the concerns that animated the Reconstruction 
generation”); Kurt T. Lash, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights: 
Beyond Incorporation, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 447, 449 (2009) (“[W]hat 
we are after is not the incorporation of 1787 texts, but the public 
understanding of 1868 texts—in particular the . . . scope of congressional 
power to enforce these newly constitutionalized rights.”). 
45. See Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 688-90; id. at 697-99 (Thomas, J., concurring); W.E.B. 
DU BOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA 153-58 (Transaction 2013) 
(chronicling the vagrancy ordinances across all southern states). For a 
sampling of such laws, see PAUL FINKELMAN & DONALD R. KENNON, ENDING THE 
CIVIL WAR AND CONSEQUENCES FOR CONGRESS 95 (2019) (“The [Mississippi 
Vagrant Law also created] a one-dollar poll tax for all free blacks. Anyone not 
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and forfeitures provided the pretext under which the conditions of slavery 
were reconstituted, for newly freed African Americans deemed guilty of 
vagrancy were subsequently auctioned off as “contract laborers.”46 The 
Fourteenth Amendment was a response to southern states’ attempts to 
recreate “slavery in fact” by targeting poor, newly freed slaves with fines 
that, when unpaid, reimposed arrangements of servitude.47 
Within the frame of pre-Timbs Excessive Fines Clause jurisprudence—
namely, the version of the gross disproportionality test presented in 
Bajakajian—the “excessiveness” of Black Code fines would be explained as 
follows: the southern states’ vagrancy fines were improperly calibrated to 
the severity of the vagrancy offense. This formulation of the Excessive 
Fines Clause violation should strike us as strange, for it implies that a 
vagrancy penalty might have passed Eighth Amendment muster if brought 
below a certain monetary amount. But the Timbs opinions, and certainly 
the aforementioned aims of the Fourteenth Amendment, do not suggest 
that the injustice of such laws is solely conditioned on the fine amount.48 
Fines of any amount imperiled newly freed slaves, who—dispossessed of 
property and economic opportunity, and thus unable to pay—were forced 
back into servitude. But without an account of these poverty conditions, 
the instrumental connection between vagrancy laws and the 
reconstitution of slavery is largely lost. An historically informed Clause 
after incorporation—one that apprehends the basics of how slavery was 
institutionally maintained—would measure unconstitutional 
excessiveness with some respect to the background economic 
circumstances of the targeted individual or group. 
Across these two historical phases, the Court understands financial 
punishment to feed into other forms of liberty deprivation. The 
seventeenth-century fine was a means of political castigation or exclusion 
that, operating against the backdrop of debt-based incarceration, often 
 
paying the tax could also be declared a vagrant and thus assigned to some 
white planter to work at hard labor.”). 
46. Garrett Epps, The Antebellum Political Background of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 175, 204 (2004). 
47. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3210 (1866) (Rep. Julian) 
(“Cunning legislative devices are being invented in most of the States to 
restore slavery in fact.”); id. at 1123 (Rep. Cook) (describing how the laws 
“sell[] men into slavery in punishment of crimes of the slightest magnitude”). 
48. See Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 688-89 (observing that “newly freed slaves were 
unable to pay imposed fines”) (emphasis added).  
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amounted to imprisonment. The vagrancy fine converted financial 
destitution into re-enslavement. In both contexts, the fine is directly tied to 
these fundamental deprivations of body and personhood. It is significant 
that the constitutional rationale—that an unpayable financial obligation 
sets off other distinct liberty deprivations (here of a determinately grave 
variety)—approximates Bearden’s doctrinal structure.49 
The Court’s discussion in Timbs is largely historical, with little 
expressly said about contemporary financial punishment or its 
consequences. But the case arose after Ferguson, and the stakes of today’s 
“royal revenue” generation are all too plain. Tyson Timbs’s brief described 
for the Court how criminal debt “can effectively control a person’s life” and 
“amount to perpetual punishment.”50 With references to Ferguson, Timbs 
observes that “defaulters may see their driver’s licenses suspended or 
their voting rights withheld,” and “[o]thers are jailed.”51 
Importantly, debt-based license suspension, voter disenfranchisement, 
and incarceration are core targets of contemporary Bearden challenges.52 
By tying the right to be free from excessive fines to these downstream 
liberty deprivations, Timbs’s brief draws attention to the normative and 
functional overlap between the two protections. Unpayable criminal debt 
makes economic survival difficult, all the while perpetuating additional 
civil and political liberty deprivations. Thus, at its imposition and 
throughout its aftermath, excessive financial punishment undermines our 
shared commitments to individual dignity and equal citizenship and must 
be limited accordingly. If the Eighth Amendment protects against the 
initial imposition of an unpayable obligation, the Bearden protection 
provides the constitutional backstop. 
B. The Equal Protection-Due Process Bearden Framework 
In Bearden v. Georgia, the Court constitutionally barred the state from 
revoking Danny Bearden’s probation—and thus re-incarcerating him—on 
 
49. As described in Section II.B, a Bearden violation takes the following 
conditional form: If failure to meet a financial obligation is the state’s basis 
for compromising a right or significant interest, then that obligation must be 
made affordable to the individual. Or, put succinctly, a significant liberty 
deprivation cannot be solely conditioned on indigency. 
50. Brief of Petitioner at 26, Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 682 (No. 17-1091). 
51. Id. at 27. 
52. See infra Section II.B. 
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the basis of his indigency.53 Due process and equal protection 
considerations “converge[d] in the Court’s analysis,”54 together generating 
a constitutional violation even though neither strand when taken 
independently would seem to register one.55 
This interweaving of wealth-based equal protection with a due process 
rationale presents a number of puzzles, many of which have come to the 
fore as lower courts extend Bearden protections into new legal areas. 
Some lower courts have recognized Bearden’s applicability within the 
incarceration-related contexts of pretrial bail56 and immigration 
detention,57 as well as the more distant contexts of license forfeiture58 and 
ex-prisoner re-enfranchisement.59 Other courts have been less willing to 
extend Bearden beyond a narrow set of incarceration-related 
circumstances, typically construing Bearden as a prudential, site-specific 
carveout within the Rodriguez rational-basis rule given incarceration’s 
severity.60 Courts have reasoned through these applications in different 
 
53. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983). 
54. Id. at 665; see also Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2603 (2015) 
(drawing on the Bearden convergence theory to set forth the right to gay 
marriage: “This interrelation of the two principles furthers our 
understanding of what freedom is and must become.”). 
55. Because there is no per se right to probation, the state could in theory have 
eliminated the option of probation for all prisoners without generating a due 
process violation. Under equal protection precedents, the state is also 
generally permitted to treat individuals differently on the basis of relative 
wealth. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29 (1973) 
(“[T]his Court has never heretofore held that wealth discrimination alone 
provides an adequate basis for invoking strict scrutiny . . . .”); see also Harris 
v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 323 (1980) (noting that the Court “has held 
repeatedly that poverty, standing alone, is not a suspect classification”). 
56. E.g., ODonnell v. Harris County, 251 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1134 (S.D. Tex. 2017); 
In re Humphrey, 228 Cal. Rptr. 3d 513 (Ct. App. 2018). 
57. E.g., Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 991-93 (9th Cir. 2017). 
58. E.g., Robinson v. Purkey, No. 3:17-cv-01263, 2018 WL 5023330, at *2 (M.D. 
Tenn. Oct. 16, 2018), rev’d, Robinson v. Long, No. 18-6121, 2020 WL 
2551889 (6th Cir. May 20, 2020). 
59. E.g., Jones v. Governor of Florida, 950 F.3d 795, 808-810, 811 n.9 (11th Cir. 
2020). 
60. E.g., Johnson v. Bredesen, 624 F.3d 742, 749 (6th Cir. 2010) (declining to 
evaluate a wealth-based felon re-enfranchisement scheme under Bearden); 
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ways, with the viability of the Bearden framework turning largely on how 
the court characterizes the underlying liberty interest and the degree of 
liberty deprivation involved. 
Without developing a complete account of Bearden’s development or 
doctrinal architecture, I aim to describe the basic structure of a Bearden-
styled claim and isolate the various liberty interests upon which successful 
Bearden challenges have been predicated. This should make clear that the 
Bearden constitutional backstop should be afforded beyond the 
incarceration context, laying the groundwork for the integrative Bearden-
Eighth Amendment analysis presented in Part III. 
1. The Bearden-Williams-Tate Line 
In 1970, the Court held in Williams v. Illinois that extending a term of 
prison beyond the statutory maximum for inability to pay restitution 
violates the Equal Protection Clause.61 The year after, in Tate v. Short, the 
Court extended Williams to the sentencing phase by holding that a state is 
constitutionally barred from imprisoning a person under a fine-only 
statute because that person cannot pay the fine.62 In 1983, Bearden 
weaved Tate and Williams into a broader rule: “only if alternative 
measures are not adequate to meet the state’s interests . . . may the court 
imprison a[n indigent] probationer who has made sufficient bona fide 
efforts to pay.”63 
The mixed theory running through the three decisions should be read 
as a carry-over from the Warren Court’s wealth-equality jurisprudence, 
which stretches back to the seminal 1956 Griffin v. Illinois decision.64 In 
 
Madison v. State, 161 Wash. 2d 85 (2007) (same). Rodriguez itself explicitly 
excepted the wealth-based detention at issue in Tate and William, deeming 
such detention to be an “absolute deprivation.” San Antonio Independent 
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 20 (1973). 
61. 399 U.S. 235 (1970). 
62. 401 U.S. 395 (1971). 
63. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 672; see also id. at 671 (“In each case, the Constitution 
prohibits the State from imposing a fine as a sentence and then automatically 
converting it into a jail term solely because the defendant is indigent . . . .”). 
64. An engaged historical analysis with the mixed theory’s rise goes beyond this 
project’s scope, though I sketch a few pivotal moments here by drawing on 
Michael Klarman’s history of modern equal protection. See Michael Klarman, 
An Interpretative History of Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV. 213 (1991). 
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Griffin, a divided Court held that indigent defendants must be provided 
with free trial transcripts if a state-created criminal appeal process 
requires that one be produced. The Court made clear that a state “is not 
required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate courts or a right 
to an appellate review,” but that once a state decides to provide review, it 
“cannot make lack of means an effective bar to the exercise of this 
opportunity.”65 In other words, the appeal is not a right per se, though 
limiting access on the basis of poverty nonetheless abridged basic equality 
principles. Griffin thus suggested a “virtually unprecedented” 
constitutional consideration for poverty.66 Its applications over the Burger 
Court era were subsequently limited, with Justice Harlan’s procedural due 
process conception of the case often used to cabin Griffin equality 
 
Klarman does not reference Bearden, Williams, or Tate, but provides a 
description of the doctrine’s backdrop that is instructive. In Griffin v. Illinois, 
351 U.S. 12 (1956), the Warren Court held that the state must provide free 
copies of trial records for indigent defendants if these records are otherwise 
available for purchase, thus invalidating a form of wealth discrimination 
premised on its disparate effects rather than on animus or some special 
designation of the poor. Id. at 255; see also Owen Fiss, Racial Imbalance in the 
Public Schools: The Constitutional Concepts, 78 HARV. L. REV. 564, 593 n.50 
(observing that Griffin’s rationale turns on disparate impact). Klarman 
observes that the Court further refined its wealth-equality precedents 
through the fundamental rights line of equal protection, in part because it 
sought some limiting principle for controlling the “virtually limitless reach of 
a constitutional rule condemning disparate wealth effects.” Klarman, supra, 
at 266. The Warren Court soon characterized Griffin as an originating point 
in this new fundamental rights line of equal protection, which runs through 
cases like Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), and Douglas v. 
California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). Come the Burger Court and its concern with 
the possibility of “judicial wealth redistribution,” the class-discrimination 
fundamental rights line is truncated and Griffin’s equality principles are 
reconceptualized in procedural due process terms. Id. at 285. Justice Harlan’s 
Griffin v. Illinois dissent, 351 U.S. 12, 36 (1956), originally suggested such a 
procedural due process framing, which is cited alongside the Griffin majority 
opinion in Bearden. See Bearden, 461 U.S. at 665. The mixed due process-
equal protection framework that emerges in Bearden is thus a function of 
these multiple and discrepant attempts to preserve certain wealth-equality 
commitments in the criminal justice context while undoing them elsewhere. 
65. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 18 (1956); id. at 24 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
66. Klarman, An Interpretative History of Equal Protection, supra note 64, at 265. 
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principles to the managerial domains of courts and prisons.67 That said, 
the Williams-Tate-Bearden line is a clear extension of the Griffin tradition. 
Williams offers that it is “applying the teaching” of Griffin, and Bearden 
sources the convergence theory of “due process and equal protection 
principles” back to it.68 
Significantly, many of the Court’s pre-Bearden decisions invoking 
Griffin (and at times Williams and Tate) concerned wealth-based 
deprivations of non-physical liberty—including, for instance, interests in 
marriage, divorce, and running for office.69 Drawing on Justice Harlan’s 
Williams concurrence, Bearden itself sets forth factors to determine when 
a wealth-based liberty deprivation is sufficiently severe to warrant 
heightened scrutiny—including the “nature” and “extent of the individual 
interest affected”—and never indicates that the interest must involve 
freedom from incarceration.70 The Court suggested as much decades later 
in M. L. B., where Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion invokes Bearden and 
the other “Griffin-line cases” to hold that indigent parents unable to pay 
court fees cannot be deprived of appellate review of the termination of 
parental rights.71 Citing to Bearden, the M. L. B. Court “inspect[ed] the 
character and intensity of the individual interest at stake”—here 
characterized as the destruction of family bonds—and deemed the 
deprivation too grave to be conditioned on wealth status.72 M. L. B. thus 
 
67. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
68. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 665; Williams, 399 U.S. at 241. 
69. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 402 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring) 
(citing Griffin to strike down a statute that conditioned marriage on the 
payment of child support); Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 720 (1974) 
(Douglas, J., concurring) (citing Griffin, Williams, and Tate to hold that states 
cannot require indigent candidates to pay campaign filing fees); Boddie v. 
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 382-84 (1971) (citing Griffin to render 
unconstitutional on due process grounds the filing fees that prevented an 
indigent couple from obtaining a divorce); id. at 383-86 (Douglas, J., 
concurring) (reaching the same outcome but on equal protection grounds). 
70. Bearden sets forth four factors: “the nature of the individual interest affected, 
the extent to which it is affected, the rationality of the connection between 
legislative means and purpose, [and] the existence of alternative means for 
effectuating the purpose.” Bearden, 461 U.S. at 666-67 (quoting Williams, 
399 U.S. at 260 (Harlan, J., concurring)). 
71. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 120 (1996); see also id. at 111 (“Griffin’s 
principle has not been confined to cases in which imprisonment is at stake.”). 
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makes clear that Bearden-styled protections can be predicated on non-
incarceration-related liberty interests, though Bearden’s outer bounds are 
left largely undefined.73 
More recent challenges to wealth-based deprivation schemes have 
spurred further consideration of the kinds of liberty interests that qualify 
for Williams-Tate-Bearden heightened scrutiny. In what follows, I survey a 
handful of recent decisions that take differing approaches to the Bearden 
doctrine. 
2. Bearden in Incarceration and Non-Incarceration Contexts 
Lower courts typically evaluate the liberty interest underwriting a 
Bearden claim along the two axes previously named: the character of the 
interest and the degree of deprivation involved. The degree tends to be at 
issue in physical liberty-related contexts like pretrial or immigration 
detention. In recent Bearden challenges to wealth-based ex-prisoner re-
enfranchisement and license suspension, whether the character of the 
interest is sufficiently fundamental typically drives the analysis. 
a. Incarceration-Related Contexts 
In ODonnell v. Harris County, a Texas district court determined that the 
liberty interest in being free from pretrial detention is sufficiently 
analogous to the interest in remaining on probation, and therefore found 
that the detention of indigent defendants violated Bearden.74 The court 
 
72. Id. at 120-25. 
73. The Court does distinguish M. L. B. from cases where complainants “sought 
state aid to subsidize their privately initiated action.” Id. at 125. In McRae, for 
instance, the Court determined that Medicaid funding need not be provided 
to subsidize medically necessary abortions. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 
297, 321-26 (1980). But in M. L. B., as well as in the Bearden applications 
evaluated here, claims of affirmative right to government aid are hardly at 
issue. 
74. The County unsuccessfully argued that the Williams-Tate-Bearden line is 
limited to the payment of post-conviction fines, and does not cover the 
pretrial phase. 251 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1137 (S.D. Tex. 2017), aff’d in part, 
rev’d in part, 892 F.3d 147 (5th Cir. 2018). The parties reached a settlement 
in November 2019, which requires an individualized ability-to-pay hearing if 
secured money bail is imposed as a condition of release. See ODonnell v. 
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sought to reconcile Bearden and ODonnell with Rodriguez’s rational-basis 
rule by emphasizing the differing degrees of deprivation at issue. It noted 
that the Supreme Court in Rodriguez had expressly excepted Williams and 
Tate from rational basis review by recognizing that the disadvantaged 
classes in those cases were “completely unable to pay for some desired 
benefit” and “sustained an absolute deprivation” as a result.75 The 
ODonnell court then contrasted the Rodriguez petitioners’ “relative” liberty 
interest in “better schooling” with the ODonnell plaintiffs’ “absolute” liberty 
interest in being free from detention.76 Given the absolute deprivation at 
stake, Bearden rather than Rodriguez applied.77 
But in a similar pretrial bail challenge, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the 
premise that detention necessarily amounts to an absolute deprivation.78 
The court observed that the bail regime imposed “merely” forty-eight 
hours of jail for indigent defendants, which it determined to be a non-
absolute deprivation when considered relative to the much longer period 
of pretrial release that the indigent person still ultimately accesses under 
the scheme.79  
The Arizona district court sided with ODonnell’s reasoning when it 
recently considered the constitutionality of a for-profit state diversionary 
program. The program compelled payment of user fees by automatically 
extending a person’s required participation until payment is made. 
According to the court, “[p]laintiffs have indeed been absolutely deprived 
of the ability to complete the program in 90 days like other, wealthier 
participants.”80 In accordance with ODonnell’s logic, excess time of any 
 
Harris County, No. 4:16-cv-01414, 2019 WL 6219933, at *6 (Nov. 21, 2019 
S.D. Tex.). 
75. San Antonio Indep. School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 20 (1973). 
76. ODonnell, 251 F. Supp. 3d at 1135. 
77. See also Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053, 1056 (5th Cir. 1978) 
(“[I]ncarceration of those who cannot [pay for pretrial release] . . . infringes 
on both due process and equal protection requirements.”). 
78. Walker v. City of Calhoun, GA, 901 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir. 2018). 
79. Id. at 1261 (“[T]hey must merely wait some appropriate amount of time to 
receive the same benefit as the more affluent.”). But see id. at 1275-76 
(Martin, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (chronicling the “very 
real consequences” of forty-eight hours in jail). 
80. Briggs v. Montgomery, No. CV-18-02684-PHX-EJM, 2019 WL 2515950, at *10 
(D. Ariz. June 18, 2019). 
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length that subjected an indigent person to prosecutorial risk and 
potential imprisonment was viewed as a unique or standalone deprivation, 
and thus violated Bearden.  
Note that the “comparator” assumed by the court shifts across these 
cases: for the Eleventh Circuit, the forty-eight hours faced by an indigent 
person is compared to the much longer period of freedom that comes after 
their own pretrial release, so the detention is treated as marginal; but for 
the Texas and Arizona district courts, the excess time in detention (or in a 
diversionary program that threatens possible future detention) is 
compared against the lack of detention (or risk) faced by a wealthier 
person.81 The distinction between “absolute” deprivation and “mere” 
diminishment in these cases is thus largely rhetorical, an outgrowth of 
Rodriguez that turns on how the court frames the liberty interest at 
stake.82 Characterizing pretrial liberty as “access to pretrial release” rather 
than “freedom from incarceration,” for instance, alters the status of the 
deprivation and the eventual outcome of the analysis.83 These are 
antecedent framing choices made by courts before and beyond an 
application of doctrine. 
b. Bearden Beyond Incarceration 
Outside the incarceration context, recent Bearden-styled challenges to 
wealth-based ex-prisoner re-enfranchisement and license suspension 
schemes have typically hinged on the “fundamental” status of the 
implicated liberty interest. In its recent and high-profile Jones v. DeSantis 
decision, the Eleventh Circuit considered the constitutionality of a Florida 
law requiring that ex-felons satisfy their financial obligations to be 
 
 81. The Eleventh Circuit’s approach lacks a fixed baseline against which the 
degree of deprivation can be judged, and therefore provides no rule to 
determine the point at which an ongoing deprivation turns absolute. 
82. In some Bearden challenges, the additional incarceration time is so 
substantial that the “absolute” status of the deprivation is not at issue. E.g., 
United States v. Parks, 89 F.3d 570, 5720-73 (9th Cir. 1996) (determining 
that the addition of a criminal history point on the basis of an unpaid fine, 
which contributed eight months to the defendant’s sentence, ran afoul of 
Bearden). 
83. See Walker, 901 F.3d at 1274 (11th Cir. 2018) (Martin, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (associating the first framing with the Walker 
majority and the second with Judge Rosenthal’s opinion in ODonnell). 
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included within an automatic re-enfranchisement scheme.84 Prior courts 
had upheld similar schemes under rational basis review, distinguishing the 
“statutory benefit” of re-enfranchisement from the “fundamental right[s]” 
and “implicated physical liberty” at issue across the Griffin-Bearden case 
line.85 But in a landmark ruling that offers to dramatically expand access to 
the vote, the Eleventh Circuit deemed the Florida scheme unconstitutional 
under heightened scrutiny.86 
The Jones per curiam opinion suggests a subtle, though significant, 
distinction between two variations of the Bearden protection, each of 
which is presented as independently sufficient to compel strict scrutiny. 
The first involves the recognizable tiers of scrutiny approach.87 State 
action abridges the interest in voting—”squarely among the interests that 
fall within Griffin’s grasp”—on the basis of wealth, and triggers heightened 
scrutiny.88 The second variation, however, does not turn on the presence 
of a fundamental interest or the showing of liberty deprivation.89 Instead, 
the Bearden protection functions as a flat ban on all wealth-based 
punishments.90 Under this second framing of Bearden, the court need only 
 
84. Jones v. Governor of Florida, 950 F.3d 795 (11th Cir. 2020). 
85. Johnson v. Bredesen, 624 F.3d 742, 748-49 (6th Cir. 2010) (emphasis added) 
(arguing that the fundamental right of access to the courts was at issue in 
Griffin); see also Madison v. State, 161 Wash. 2d. 85, 105 (2007) (same). But 
see supra note 64 (noting that the Griffin opinions do not characterize access 
to an appeal as a per se right). 
86. Jones, 950 F.3d at 800; see also Jones v. DeSantis, No. 4:19cv300-RH/MJF, 
2020 WL 2618062, at *1 (N.D. Fla. May 24, 2020) (determining that the 
state’s “pay-to-vote” system as applied to all individuals was 
unconstitutional). 
87. See Jones, 950 F.3d at 820-25. 
88. Id. at 821; see also id. at 823 (“Williams, Tate, and Bearden establish . . . that 
the state’s ability to deprive someone of a profoundly important interest 
does not change the nature of the right, nor whether it is deserving of 
heightened scrutiny when access to it is made to depend on wealth.”). 
89. See id. at 817-20. 
90. See id. at 818. As traced by Colgan, the flat ban reading accurately reflects 
Bearden’s historical development. See Beth A. Colgan, Wealth-Based Penal 
Disenfranchisement, 72 VAND. L. REV. 55, 116-20 (2019) (“Reading the 
Bearden line in conjunction with the contemporaneous development of the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel . . . makes clear that from the line’s 
inception the Court unflaggingly rejected penalty-based distinctions . . . .”). 
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ask whether the state action qualifies as punishment. If it does, then the 
ban applies—unaffected by the severity level of the deprivation or the 
character of the punishment itself.91 
The flat ban view of Bearden would be a particularly significant 
development in contexts like driver’s license suspension, where the 
severity of the individual liberty deprivation has often been deemed 
inadequate. For instance, in reviewing the constitutionality of Michigan’s 
policy to suspend a person’s driver’s license on the basis of unpaid court 
debt, the Sixth Circuit determined that the “property interest” in the 
license does not approximate the physical liberty interest in Bearden, nor 
does it constitute a fundamental right.92 In a corollary case, the court 
further distinguished this interest from the “unique” parental rights at 
issue in M. L. B.93 Dissenting opinions and opinions below appropriately 
recognized that license deprivation implicates “a basic and fundamental 
necessity”94 and “the debtor’s interest in self-sufficiency;”95 indeed, an 
inability to drive closes off employment prospects and can lead to firing, 
makes obtaining food or medical care difficult, and limits participation in 
communal life.96 The interest is therefore bound up in a wide range of 
livelihood and economic survival-related interests, the constitutional 
gravity of which Timbs has helped elucidate.97 But to the extent these 
 
91. See Jones, 950 F.3d at 819 (“Disenfranchisement is punishment. We have said 
so clearly.”). 
92. Fowler v. Benson, 924 F.3d 247, 261, 261 n.8 (6th Cir. 2019) (upholding the 
policy under rational basis review). 
93. See Robinson v. Long, No. 18-6121, 2020 WL 2551889, at *3 (6th Cir. May 20, 
2020). 
94. Fowler, 924 F.3d 247 at 272 (Donald, J., dissenting). 
95. Robinson v. Purkey, 326 F.R.D. 105, 154 (M.D. Tenn. 2018), rev’d, Robinson v. 
Long, No. 18-6121, 2020 WL 2551889, at *1 (6th Cir. May 20, 2020). 
96. See id. at 156. 
97. Timbs marks a new understanding of the constitutional severity of state-
imposed livelihood deprivation and financial destruction. See supra Section 
II.A. Its livelihood deprivation principle finds particular resonance here, 
given the Court’s established stance that driver’s licenses are “essential in 
the pursuit of a livelihood.” Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971). In turn, 
Timbs lends additional credence to the liberty interests at stake in license 
suspension schemes, which immobilize people physically and financially 
solely because of their poverty. I note that this analysis falls cleanly outside 
M. L. B.’s affirmative subsidization exception. See supra note 73 and 
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interests remain thought of as non-fundamental, the ban variation 
suggested in Jones may provide one plausible path forward for litigants. 
III. SYNTHESIZING THE PROTECTIONS: TWO “LOOKS” AT INDIGENCY 
This Part identifies additional conceptual overlaps between the two 
doctrines and demonstrates that many forms of financial punishment 
qualify as constitutional violations under either. For instance, Bearden 
violations can often be redescribed as Excessive Fines Clause violations 
because failure to pay at conversion typically implies an inability to pay at 
imposition. Given these considerations, I offer two ways to frame the 
procedural relationship between the protections. 
Section III.A frames the Bearden backstop as a “second look” at 
excessive fines, while Section III.B frames the Clause as a “preemptive 
look” at Bearden-styled liberty deprivations. Together, they place criminal 
debt in a continuum stretching between two constitutional poles, and 
across which additional constitutionally informed protections should be 
developed. 
A. Reading Timbs into Bearden 
Financial obligations are imposed, accrue, and amount to liberty 
deprivations over time. In some situations, the obligation is ultimately paid 
off but still strains a person’s ability to survive economically; in others, the 
obligation remains unpaid and gives rise to additional liberty 
consequences. It should be plain enough that an Excessive Fines Clause 
violation is often temporally and analytically antecedent to a Bearden 
violation.98 A financial obligation that is unaffordable at the moment of 
 
accompanying discussion. Even if the initial issuance of a license qualifies as 
an affirmative grant, complainants here only seek to keep their licenses. This 
would not seem to involve state subsidization or support. 
98. Under the tiers of scrutiny theory, a Bearden violation requires that (1) a 
failure to pay occurred despite the individual’s bona fide effort to pay; (2) 
the government interest could have been satisfied by a means other than 
through the deprivation of a liberty interest; and (3) the predicate liberty 
interest is of a relevant character (as evaluated in Section II.B.2). See Louis 
Fisher, Criminal Justice User Fees and the Procedural Aspect of Equal Justice, 
133 HARV. L. REV. 112, 135 (2020) (breaking the Bearden violation down into 
the first two steps). I have added step three. My argument here concerns the 
overlap between the Clause and step one. 
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conversion was possibly, if not probably, unaffordable when it was initially 
imposed. Bearden, Tate, and Williams, for instance, all involved exorbitant 
fines that could have been additionally challenged under the Clause, had 
such a theory been available.99 As suggested at the end of Section II.A, a 
Bearden violation might thus be understood as a downstream consequence 
of an excessive fine left unaddressed. 
It is often the case that an individual fine or fee may not appear 
unaffordable in isolation but impairs one’s livelihood when aggregated 
with other obligations. Court and diversion program fees, for instance, may 
be individually small yet constantly imposed, quickly becoming 
unaffordable.100 When considered ex post from the vantage of a Bearden 
conversion, a set of financial obligations might be treated as a cumulative 
Excessive Fines Clause violation.101 In the Cruel and Unusual Punishments 
domain, for instance, the Court has recognized that conditions of 
confinement can amount to an Eighth Amendment violation “in 
combination; when each would not do so alone, but only when they have a 
mutually enforcing effect that produces the deprivation of a single, 
identifiable human need.”102 So too, the accumulation of financial 
obligations can spill over into a livelihood deprivation even when each 
obligation appears affordable in isolation. Whether a Bearden claim is 
predicated on one unpaid obligation or the unaffordable sum of many 
smaller ones, an Eighth Amendment violation is to be implied.103 
 
99. The petitioner in Tate faced $425 in traffic fines. See Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 
395, 396 (1971). Danny Bearden faced a $500 fine and $250 in restitution, 
which he was unable to satisfy in the four-month period prescribed by the 
court. See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 662 (1983). Arguably, the $250 
in restitution could be deemed non-punitive and thus beyond the coverage 
of the Clause. But see supra note 18 and accompanying discussion. 
100. E.g., Briggs v. Montgomery, No. CV_18-02684-PHX-EJM, 2019 WL 2515950 
(D. Ariz. June 18, 2019) (considering a marijuana diversion scheme that 
charged $15 to $17 per drug test up to three times a week). 
101. See Kerry Abrams & Brandon L. Garrett, Cumulative Constitutional Rights, 97 
B.U. L. REV. 1309 (2017). 
102. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991); see Abrams & Garrett, supra note 
101, at 1322. 
103. Fines lend themselves to aggregation much better than the qualitative 
aspects of confinement and thus make a compelling candidate for the 
cumulative violation theory. But my argument is not wholly dependent on 
the viability of this theory. Consider a situation where $5 fees are 
systematically assessed against a person whose maximum ability to pay is 
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1. Bearden as a “Second Look” 
The Bearden protection thus affords a “second look” at an earlier 
obligation’s constitutionality, all the while providing a backstop against an 
additional liberty deprivation flowing from that unmet obligation. The idea 
of a constitutionally required “second look” is not altogether foreign to the 
Court, but bears similarity to the Court’s reasoning in other Eighth 
Amendment contexts. Consider, for instance, Miller and Montgomery’s 
constitutional logic of requiring parole hearings in situations of juvenile 
life imprisonment.104 The state must afford juvenile offenders the 
possibility of a “second look” at some point in the future in light of a child’s 
rehabilitative potential and the constitutional gravity of life imprisonment. 
Similarly, the state must afford individuals a “second look” at criminal 
debt, in light of newly accrued financial obligations and the gravity of an 
imminent liberty deprivation. 
In sum, an indigent defendant’s failure to pay should often be sufficient 
to ground an Eighth Amendment violation even where the other necessary 
elements of a Bearden claim—that the state has no other alternative 
means and that the liberty deprivation is sufficiently fundamental and 
absolute—are not demonstrated.105 Litigants should recognize this 
overlap and consider bringing Bearden and Eighth Amendment challenges 
in tandem. 
B. Reading Bearden into Timbs 
Understanding the changes to criminal punishment in the decades 
since the 1983 Bearden decision—specifically, the financialization of 
 
$100. If fees were assessed twenty-one times, we could either say that the 
twenty-one fees are cumulatively excessive, or that the twenty-first fee in 
particular is excessive given the prior fees. This second description does not 
require aggregation. It only requires that courts calculate ability to pay in 
light of the prior financial obligations already owed at the time of imposition. 
104. Miller v. Alabama bars mandatory life imprisonment without parole for 
juveniles because children have “diminished culpability and greater 
prospects for reform.” 567 U.S. 460, 471 (2012); see also Montgomery v. 
Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016) (applying Miller retroactively). 
105. For an account of the Bearden elements, see supra note 70. My argument 
assumes that an inability to pay is a per se violation of the Excessive Fines 
Clause. 
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punishment and new uses of financial sanctions—further clarifies the need 
for both protections. As Bearden was decided, the early 1980s marked the 
proliferation of financial sanctions and related shifts in the institutional 
forms of criminal justice and crime prevention.106 The causes behind the 
increased uses of fines are difficult to isolate, though they likely involved 
the mass scaling of incarceration over the course of the 1970s and 
1980s.107 From that period to today, obligations have provided a way for 
legislatures to displace the costs of this industrialized expansion onto 
justice-involved people themselves, rather than pass those costs onto the 
broader tax base.108 In principle, the Williams-Tate-Bearden line aims to 
intervene between fines and imprisonment by proscribing the state’s use 
of incarceration as a leveraging tool to collect on criminal debt. 
But the reach of the criminal justice system has changed in recent 
decades, as has the relationship between poverty and incarceration. State 
punishment power has spread across a wider range of legal, bureaucratic, 
and nongovernmental actors, many of which possess significant legal 
 
106. See Martin et al., supra note 3, at 2 (observing that the frequency of fines and 
forfeitures has increased since the 1980s at every level of government). 
107. Fines and probation were the common forms of punishment during the 
postwar decades, comporting with then-dominant “welfarist” or 
rehabilitative criminological perspectives. See DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF 
CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 167 (2001). But, 
breaking with these perspectives, penological currents in the 1970s and 
1980s emphasized expressive and security-minded punishment 
administered through the prison. Id. at 175. While the use of the fine 
continued to expand throughout this period, see Martin et al., supra note 3, 
its rationale now depended on the prison. The fine had become a revenue-
generating tool to meet mass incarceration’s costs, in service to 
incarceration rather than the principal mode of punishment in its own right. 
108. See Brief for Professors in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari as Amici 
Curiae at 5, Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019) (No. 17-1091) 
(“[B]ecause this is a financially profitable enterprise, it is often also 
politically profitable: many who bear the brunt of fines and forfeitures lack 
the power to resist them. The government knows this, and also knows that 
raising broadly applicable taxes instead of raising revenue from fines and 
forfeitures would likely spur a political backlash.”). For an estimation of the 
costs of mass incarceration, see LOÏC WACQUANT, PUNISHING THE POOR: THE 
NEOLIBERAL GOVERNMENT OF SOCIAL INSECURITY 64 (George Steinmetz & Julia 
Adams eds., 2009), which calculates that federal funding for criminal justice 
multiplied by 5.4 times between 1972 and 1990—from under $2 billion to 
over $10 billion. 
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authority to impose financial obligations and participate in collection.109 
For instance, civil asset forfeiture as highlighted in Timbs has increased 
substantially since the 1990s.110 Such property forfeitures can affect one’s 
ability to satisfy other legal obligations and may in turn trigger 
imprisonment or a host of additional deprivations much like fines do.111 
But forfeitures do not typically take the form of a conditional Bearden-
styled claim, as they do not impose an unpaid obligation (in a sense, the 
forfeiture is itself the payment). 
Even wealth-based incarceration—the paradigm case—is thought to 
have increased in recent years, evolving in ways that can make identifying 
and proving up violations difficult. For instance, the increasingly 
privatized nature of criminal justice administration—including diversion, 
probation, and other supervisory schemes—can make it difficult for courts 
to distinguish debt-based incarceration from incarceration that is the 
result of other forms of noncompliance.112 Similarly, incarceration is often 
imposed under the guise of “court order” violations, which can obscure 
that the incarceration stems from an unpaid obligation.113 
 
109. Assessments of this dispersion of punishment authority have varied. See, e.g., 
GARLAND, supra note 107, at 170; Heather Schoenfeld, A Research Agenda on 
Reform: Penal Policy and Politics Across the States, 664 ANNALS AM. ASSOC. POL. 
SCI. 155, 157 (2016); Vesla M. Weaver & Amy E. Lerman, Political 
Consequences of the Carceral State, 104 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 817, 818 (2010). 
110. See Dick M. Carpenter et al., Policing for Profit: The Abuse of Civil Asset 
Forfeiture, INST. FOR JUST. 2 (Nov. 2015), https://ij.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/11/policing-for-profit-2nd-edition.pdf. 
111. “For example, the loss of an automobile may interfere with conditions 
requiring attendance at work or school, [or] meetings with probation and 
parole staff . . . .” Beth A. Colgan & Nicholas M. McLean, Financial Hardship 
and the Excessive Fines Clause: Assessing the Severity of Property Forfeitures 
After Timbs, 129 YALE L.J.F. 430, 446 (2020). 
112. See Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 VAND. L. REV. 
1055, 1085 (2015); Confined and Costly: How Supervision Violations Are 
Filling Prisons and Burdening Budgets, CSG JUST. CTR. (June 2019), 
https://csgjusticecenter.org/publications/confined-costly; In for a Penny: 
The Rise of America’s New Debtors’ Prisons, ACLU 58-59 (Oct. 2010), 
https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/InForAPenny_web.pdf. 
113. See Matthew Menendez et al., The Steep Costs of Criminal Justice Fees and 
Fines, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. 6 (2019), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2020-
07/2019_10_Fees%26Fines_Final.pdf (“[W]hen failure to pay is not an 
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This is only a limited survey of recent developments, though it is 
meant to suggest that financial punishment—including the extent of fines 
and fees, as well as the methods by which financial obligations are 
collected upon—has outgrown narrow formulations of the Bearden-Tate-
Williams protection. These formulations assume that the conversion 
between an unpaid obligation and the resulting liberty deprivation is 
direct, programmatic, and identifiable to a court. But individuals are 
accumulating criminal-justice debt continuously and often unknowingly, 
the lived consequences of which can be catastrophic (and often include 
incarceration) but can be difficult to capture in a discrete, backward-
looking Bearden violation. 
1. The Excessive Fines Clause as a “Preemptive Look” 
Expanding the constitutional focus beyond the conversion question 
(whether a financial obligation, by nature of being unaffordable, did in fact 
result in a liberty deprivation) and toward the initial financial obligation 
itself is one way of adapting judicial oversight to these developments. Of 
course, an Excessive Fines Clause-styled claim does just this by challenging 
the financial obligation at its imposition, and need not wait for the fine to 
spiral into a cognizable liberty deprivation. But framing the upfront 
protection provided by the Clause as a preemptive or prophylactic variant 
on Bearden,114 made necessary by these shifting forms of punishment and 
revenue generation, leads into a few additional considerations. 
 
explicit charge, jail sentences are handed down for failure to appear or 
failure to comply—infractions that often stem from failure to pay . . . . Under 
the guise of different charges, such a policy perpetuates the function of a 
debtors’ prison.”). 
114. The “prophylactic” framing is admittedly polarizing, though such rules are 
ubiquitous and often legitimate. See Evan H. Caminker, Miranda and Some 
Puzzles of ‘Prophylactic’ Rules, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 2 (2001) (“[S]uch rules 
respond to the inevitability of imperfect judicial detection of constitutional 
wrongdoing.”); David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 190, 195-98 (1988) (distinguishing legitimate from illegitimate 
prophylactic rules). “Prophylaxis” is particularly legitimate in this context, 
where the Clause already applies at the front end of the debt-imposition 
process (this is not an instance of stretching a constitutional protection to 
where there would otherwise be none). The Clause remains underdeveloped 
and to an extent open-ended, and its meaning and function should be 
interpreted in light of Bearden’s principles. 
YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW 38 : 439 2020 
474 
First, when the effects of a financial imposition are in fact identifiable, 
courts should take them into account in the course of the excessive fines 
ability-to-pay evaluation.115 If the constitutional rationale for the upfront 
protection is as much about proportional punishment as it is about staving 
off the downstream, liberty-denying effects of financial obligations (that 
may well cumulate in Bearden violations), it follows that prospective 
hardship should be factored into assessments of affordability. For instance, 
when the forfeiture of a vehicle would predictably make it difficult for a 
person to meet conditions of probation, that risk should be incorporated 
into the initial ability-to-pay consideration. Fees imposed in contexts like 
pre-prosecution diversion programs—where the conditional liberty 
interests are both apparent and substantial—should be subjected to a 
more stringent ability-to-pay standard.116 The same may be said about 
initial assessments of financial obligations in jurisdictions where license 
suspension is widespread and predictable. Bearden provides a doctrinal 
justification for building this kind of consequence-oriented, contextual 
flexibility into the excessiveness determination. 
Second, bringing Bearden’s reasoning to bear may also help answer a 
popular lower-court rationale for refusing to engage in ability-to-pay 
determinations: that the person might be presently unable to afford an 
 
115. See Colgan & McLean, supra note 111, at 447-49 (describing how 
consequence-based assessments at imposition could reduce the financial 
hardship posed by forfeitures). 
116. Termination from a pre-prosecution diversion program can expose indigent 
participants to prosecution and the possibility of a criminal record and 
imprisonment. See, e.g., State v. Jiminez, 810 P.2d 801 (N.M. 1991) 
(recognizing these potential liberty deprivations and determining that an 
indigent defendant cannot be terminated from a diversion program); Moody 
v. State, 717 So. 2d 562 (Miss. 1998) (same). In Briggs v. Montgomery, No. 
CV_18-02684-PHX-EJM, 2019 WL 2515950 (D. Ariz. June 18, 2019), a class of 
plaintiffs brought a Bearden challenge against a marijuana diversion 
program that subjects participants to a host of user fees. Notably, the 
plaintiffs challenged the extended risk of prosecution they faced within the 
scheme, rather than the absence of individualization at the front-end 
imposition of program costs. See id. at *11. But if an Excessive Fines Clause 
claim were also raised against such a scheme (though the putatively 
remedial character of the fees may prove one constraint), a participant’s 
ability to pay should be reduced in light of the error costs of a potential 
wealth-based prosecution. 
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obligation, but “might legitimately come into money . . . in the future.”117 
But in the Bearden context, the Court has made clear that pressuring a 
person without means to “come into money” can have “perverse,” 
criminogenic effects and is fundamentally incompatible with legitimate 
penological goals.118 Even if there are constitutionally relevant differences 
between punitive and remedial obligations,119 the defectiveness of this 
reasoning remains the same. If anything, a forward-looking understanding 
of the Clause would suggest that the individualized excessiveness 
determination should be made both at imposition and open to 
reassessment in the event a person’s financial situation turns worse.120 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Whether it is the loss of livelihood and economic ruination, or the loss 
of physical liberty or the right to vote, the constitutional gravity of 
financial punishment cannot be overstated. Constitutional scrutiny must 
therefore be meaningfully extended across the criminal debt continuum. 
 
117. United States v. Smith, 656 F.3d 821, 828 (8th Cir. 2011) (emphasis added); 
see also cases cited supra note 22 (invoking similar reasoning). 
118. See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 670-71 (1983) (“Revoking the 
probation of someone who through no fault of his own is unable to make 
restitution will not make restitution suddenly forthcoming. Indeed, such a 
policy may have the perverse effect of inducing the probationer to use illegal 
means to acquire funds to pay . . . .”); see also Jones v. Governor of Florida, 
950 F.3d 795, 811 (11th Cir. 2020) (“The simple truth is that a collection-
based rationale for those who genuinely cannot pay, and who offer no 
immediate prospects of being able to do so, erects a barrier ‘without 
delivering any money at all.’” (quoting Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 389 
(1978))); United States v. Fuentes, 107 F.3d 1515, 1529 n.26 (11th Cir. 
1997) (“[A] defendant subject to an impossible restitution order has less 
incentive to seek remunerative, rehabilitative, and non-criminal employment 
and to maximize his or her income than a defendant subject to a difficult but 
doable order.”); Robinson v. Purkey, 326 F.R.D. 105, 154 (M.D. Tenn. 2018) 
(“No person can be threatened or coerced into paying money that she does 
not have and cannot get.”). 
119. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
120. For instance, Danny Bearden was unable to afford subsequent installments 
of the criminal debt he owed because he lost his job after the initial 
imposition. See Bearden, 461 U.S. at 661. 
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Depending on which protection is chosen to anchor the analysis, the 
relationship between the two can be expressed in different constitutional 
terms. From the vantage of the Bearden protection, an Excessive Fines 
Clause-based ability-to-pay inquiry at the moment a fine is imposed might 
be conceptualized as a “preemptive” protection. Alternatively, from the 
vantage of the Excessive Fines Clause at-imposition protection, Bearden 
might be conceptualized as a “second-look” protection along the logic of 
other Eighth Amendment protections—including, for instance, the right to 
a “second look” provided to juveniles in life sentences.121 From either 
vantage, Bearden and the Excessive Fines Clause protections are 
fundamentally complementary. 
 
121. See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016); Miller v. Alabama, 567 
U.S. 460 (2012). 
